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Abstract 
 This thesis looks at the state of marriage equality activism in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s June 26, 2013 decisions in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth 
v. Perry. Some scholars, such as Gerald Rosenberg, argue that Supreme Court decisions 
can never affect “significant social change,” either directly or indirectly, while others 
argue that such decisions can be hugely important in directly affecting policy. My focus 
is on how activist organizations, which have a substantial track record of directly 
affecting policy, are influenced by changes to the political environment stemming from 
major Court decisions regarding social issues. After examining how past litigative efforts 
such as Baehr v. Lewin and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health have affected the 
LGBT rights movement, and marriage equality activism specifically, I discuss how 
organizational strategies have changed minimally, but the political environment in which 
marriage equality activism is operating has shifted quite a bit, especially in terms of 
framing and legal precedent. I conclude that Court decisions can indeed have a significant 
impact on social change by affecting the way in which it is possible for activists on both 
sides of the issue to shape and deliver their message to the general public, legislators, and 
courts in future litigative efforts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States released two highly 
anticipated decisions for cases regarding same-sex marriage – Hollingsworth v. Perry and 
United States v. Windsor. Protestors and supporters swarmed the front steps of the 
Supreme Court building in Washington D.C., awaiting the final decisions to be released 
for cases heard in the 2012 and 2013 term. The outcome of the Court’s decisions would 
significantly affect, it seemed, the immediate fate of same-sex marriage in the United 
States; a lot potentially hung in the balance for both supporters and opponents of 
marriage equality.  
 Perry was an appeal to overturn a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
striking down Proposition 8 in California, an amendment to the state constitution that 
restricted marriage to between one man and one woman. Prior to the passage of 
Proposition 8 in November 2008, same-sex marriage had been legal in California 
following a California State Supreme Court decision in May 2008 stating that restricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples was in violation of the state’s constitution. A Supreme 
Court decision striking down Proposition 8 as unconstitutional under the United States 
Constitution would both re-legalize same-sex marriage in California, and rule all other 
state constitutional amendments restricting marriage to between one man and one 
woman, amendments which 29 states besides California had at the time.1 Perry reached 
the Supreme Court after passing through the U.S. District Court of the Northern District 
                                                
1 "Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws." 
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of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, both of which found Proposition 8 
to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  
 Windsor focused on the federal government’s refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriages and grant them federal benefits under the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA. 
Windsor’s path to the Supreme Court had begun when Edith Windsor had sued the 
government to issue her a refund of the $363,053 estate tax she had been required to pay 
on her inheritance from the estate of her deceased wife, Thea Spyer. Had the federal 
government recognized their marriage, Windsor would have qualified for an unlimited 
spousal deduction and would not have had to pay a tax.3 The federal government 
contested the refund, but at the same time the Obama administration announced that they 
believed DOMA, specifically Section III of the law, was unconstitutional and that the 
Justice Department would no longer be defending it in court disputes, but would continue 
enforcing it unless and until the Supreme Court also determined it to be unconstitutional.4 
However, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives 
filed a motion to intervene and defend the constitutionality of DOMA and Section III. 
The case passed through the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, both of which sided with Windsor in finding 
Section III of DOMA unconstitutional.5 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for 
Perry on March 26, 2013, and for Windsor on March 27, 2013. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Perry, delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
seemed on the surface to be rather underwhelming on a national level, but extremely 
                                                
2 Barnes, Robert.  
3 Schwartz, John.  
4 United States Department of Justice. 
5 Windsor v. United States. 
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positive for marriage equality supporters when it came to the state of California. The 
Court held that the petitioners, supporters of Proposition 8, did not have standing in the 
case because they had suffered no legal harm as a function of same-sex marriage being 
legal.6 The case was dismissed on these grounds and found that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals should not have reviewed the case either, sending the case back to the District 
Court, where Judge Vaughn Walker had found Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.7 While this did nothing to change national 
policy regarding same-sex marriage, it did re-legalize same-sex marriage in California in 
a way that would be much more difficult to overturn in the future.  
 With regards to Windsor, the Supreme Court affected national policy much more 
directly, although perhaps not as completely as marriage equality proponents would have 
liked. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who also authored landmark gay rights decisions like 
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, wrote the majority opinion, in which the Court 
struck down Section III of DOMA. The constitutional basis for this ruling was based in 
Due Process, Equal Protection, and federalism.8 While this did not have the effect of 
legalizing same-sex marriage on a national level, it did require the federal government to 
recognize and provide benefits to legally married same-sex couples in the same way that 
it does opposite-sex couples. While not a broadly sweeping victory in the eyes of 
marriage equality supporters, most view it as an important step on the road to full federal 
legalization.  
                                                
6 Hollingsworth v. Perry.  
7 Dolan, Maura. 
8 Liptak, Adam.  
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 The same-sex marriage decisions have been widely viewed as landmarks for the 
Supreme Court and for social policy in America. But how important are the decisions in 
Windsor and Perry, really, in terms of causing social change in the United States? How 
do these decisions really affect marriage equality activist strategies and the political 
environment in which said activism operates? What is the tangible impact of these Court 
opinions? 
 With respect to real-world, political significance, these questions help us examine 
how the Supreme Court marriage equality decisions affect the current state and the future 
of marriage equality activism. This is important because same-sex marriage is a very 
controversial topic in our current political climate, and can perhaps be viewed as our 
era’s equivalent to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The tangible 
effects of the decisions are that the federal government now must recognize and provide 
benefits to same-sex married couples (due to Windsor), and that anti-marriage equality 
activists will likely find it harder to bring a suit claiming any damage caused to them by 
legalizing gay marriage (due to the lack of standing found in Perry). But how do these 
decisions affect activist strategies or the political landscape? 
 With respect to significance as a contribution to the literature surrounding the 
topic of the Supreme Court affecting social change, this would look at the indirect effects 
of Supreme Court decisions through activism and activist organizations. It will also 
examine the idea that indirect effects of Court decisions are just as important as direct 
effects of Court decisions.  
 Thus, the question guiding my research is: can the Supreme Court cause social 
change indirectly by affecting activist strategies and the political environment in which 
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activists operate, specifically in the case of marriage equality activism in the wake of 
United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry? 
  
Can the Supreme Court Affect Social Change? 
 The question of the efficacy of the Supreme Court at affecting social change has 
been a central point of debate in the academic literature. Main theories regarding the 
issue can generally be categorized into one of two camps: on the one hand, that the Court 
can produce significant social change, on the other, that it nearly never can. 
 One of the seminal works claiming the latter – that the Court rarely, if ever, 
produces significant social change – is Gerald Rosenberg’s book The Hollow Hope. 
Rosenberg defines social change as, “policy change with nationwide impact,” which is a 
very broad definition of the term – what, exactly, constitutes “nationwide impact?” 9 I 
find his definition to be loose enough that it is difficult for any litigative efforts to meet 
the standards that he sets for fulfilling what he defines as “significant social change.” I 
find a more workable definition of significant social change to be “a change in policy that 
changes the social status quo for a majority of a particular demographic group.” This 
demographic group could be Southern Blacks, who Rosenberg focuses on in his study on 
Brown and school desegregation; women, who Rosenberg focuses on in his study on Roe 
and other women’s rights issues; or the LGBT community, who Rosenberg focuses on in 
his study of early marriage equality litigation, and who I will be focusing on here. While 
this definition is certainly not perfect, it helps to narrow the scope of “significant social 
change” in a way that proves more useful for my purposes.  
                                                
9   Rosenberg, Gerald N., 4 
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 Rosenberg argues that the Court can only cause significant social change if it 
overcomes all of the three constraints laid out in what he refers to as the “Constrained 
Court View:” 1) The limited nature of constitutional rights, which can be overcome if 
there is “ample legal precedent for change;” 2) the lack of judicial independence, which 
can be overcome if the executive and legislative branches substantially support the 
change; and 3) the judiciary’s lack of powers of implementation, which can be overcome 
if there are high levels of public support or low levels of public opposition.10 Once these 
constraints have been overcome, at least one of four conditions must be met: 1) “Positive 
incentives are offered to induce compliance;” 2) “costs are imposed to induce 
compliance;” 3) “court decisions allow for market implementation;” or 4) 
“Administrators and officials crucial for implementation are willing to act and see court 
orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind.”11 However, 
Rosenberg also claims that if court action manages to overcome all of these obstacles, it 
is more likely that the social change being seen is the result of public opinion or action on 
the part of the executive or legislative branches than it is the result of a Court decision.12 
He uses several case studies to illustrate his theory – that the Court is not an effective 
actor when it comes to creating social change – including a case study on gay rights 
activism and litigation up through 2004. He does raise the idea in each case study that 
Supreme Court decisions could indirectly lead to social change through “extra-judicial” 
influence, such as inspiring others to act on the issue and creating a favorable political 
                                                
10 Rosenberg, Gerald N., 35-36 
11 Rosenberg, Gerald N., 36 
12 Rosenberg, Gerald N., 35 
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climate, but systematically argues against this idea in each instance.13 However, his 
methodology is a bit suspect when viewed from a standpoint that focuses more on 
political reality and subtleties as opposed to his focus on direct, quantifiable causal 
effects. He uses data and graphs to try and find direct causal links between Court 
decisions and specific outcomes that he deems important, such as media coverage or 
policies passed by the legislative branch. Such direct causal links in the way he uses them 
are rarely seen in the politics of social change, which tends to manifest itself as more of a 
domino effect, but even when he looks at “extra-judicial” effects of the Court, he refuses 
to acknowledge potential domino-like effects and the way that Court decisions affect 
activist group strategies and the political environment. This lack of acknowledgement is 
significant in this case because he does seem to view organizations and activist groups as 
strong actors when it comes to social change, but tends to claim that this court influence 
does not have a significant effect on these activists by pointing out that most activist 
groups and activities were started prior to the corresponding court decision. However, he 
does not discuss the idea of changed activist strategies or a different political 
environment in which activism operates, both of which could significantly affect the path 
of activist work surrounding an issue. Thus, it would follow that if Supreme Court 
decisions can be shown to affect activist strategies or the political environment in which 
activism operates, then the Court indirectly affects social change.  
 The idea of indirect social change being influenced by the Supreme Court through 
on-the-ground activism can be gleaned using the ideas presented by Doug McAdam, 
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly’s 2001 work Dynamics of Contention. The authors 
                                                
13  Rosenberg, Gerald N., 107, 229, 292, 303, 335, 355 
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focus on the idea that certain political conditions are much more conducive to certain 
types of activism than others, and that these conditions can be influenced by a variety of 
factors. This is particularly helpful because they introduce the idea that “general trends” 
can contribute to a final social environment that is particularly hospitable to certain types 
of social movements and social change, which helps counteract Rosenberg’s assertion 
that for Supreme Court decisions to be significant on a social scale, they must create 
direct and statistically visible change.14 In reality, Court decisions often build off of one 
another and Congressional legislation, encouraging or discouraging social trends in a way 
that can impact the efficacy of certain social movements. Regarding the same-sex 
marriage issue, it could be said that Perry and Windsor have perhaps created a more 
favorable environment for marriage equality activism (perhaps by specifically 
strengthening a particular “frame”) and a less favorable environment for anti-marriage 
equality activism. Thus, the Court can affect activist activity, and therefore indirectly 
cause social change, even if court decisions do not directly lead to strategy changes on an 
organizational level.  
 Finally, there are theories specifically dictating that the Courts are a significant 
actor when it comes to social change. A rather direct opposing view to Rosenberg, and 
one that is more supportive of my approach, is that of Michael McCann in his book 
Rights at Work. McCann specifically focuses on pay equity between the sexes, but his 
general look at the effectiveness of litigation in bringing about change in that arena is 
applicable. While he notes that he began his research on pay equity expecting to end up 
agreeing with the conventional approach – the approach espoused by Rosenberg – he 
                                                
14 McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly., 94 
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explains that the course of his investigation led him to believe that legal norms both 
significantly affected the fight for pay equity and that activists gained power from 
litigation, “despite only limited judicial support.”15 While this positive connection 
between activism and the Court is useful for my framework, it does not look at how the 
Court affects activism strategies in any direct manner, and I think any effects of this sort 
are important to look at. Similar but less specific theories regarding the Court affecting 
social change, seen in books like Gordon Silverstein’s Law’s Allure and Robert Kagan’s 
Adversarial Legalism, argue that the Court is usually efficient at producing social change 
in a way that political processes are often not, which is why groups seeking rights tend to 
choose a litigative path. Both the negatives and positives of this push towards litigation in 
a general or legal sense are discussed, particularly in Kagan’s theory of Janus-faced 
legalism.16 However, these theories too do not discuss the way in which the Court 
influences activism strategies or the political environment specifically in a way that 
creates a change in how organizations affect or attempt to affect public opinion, policy, or 
mobilization. They also tend to focus on the Court being able to make change in a direct 
manner, rather than examining in any depth the idea of the Court affecting change in an 
indirect manner by affecting the way in which activist organizations operate.  
 
Social Change Through Indirect Action 
 Instead of attempting to prove that the Supreme Court can cause significant social 
change in a direct manner, as in, by directly affecting policy or public opinion, I rather 
seek to discover the ways in which the Court can affect policy, public opinion, and other 
                                                
15 McCann, Michael W., 4 
16 Kagan, Robert A., 31 
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indicators of significant social change by affecting activist group strategies, or through 
affecting the political environment in a way that makes activism more or less effective 
than it may have been prior to a Court decision. While I do not discount the idea that the 
Court can affect change in a direct manner, or even the idea that it cannot affect direct 
change at all, I will not be focusing on those questions. I will also not be delving into the 
concept of “judicial activism,” or whether or not the Court should be able or willing to 
make significant social changes, which is another discussion altogether. Indirect effects 
of the Supreme Court are often discussed as causing chain-of-events that lead to social 
change, or by causing significant backlash that can actually hamper social change. 
Instead of looking at a long chain of events potentially sparked by a Court decision, or 
the negative effects it potentially produced, I will be focusing on how decisions, 
specifically those decisions handed down in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, affect the strategies of marriage equality organizations in terms of litigation, 
attempts to create policy, mobilization, and the shaping of public opinion in their favor, 
as well as looking at how the political environment has shifted in a way that makes their 
activism more effective. I chose to focus on these cases in particular because of the nature 
of the decisions that were handed down by the Supreme Court in each case. Since the 
decisions were not broad and sweeping in the sense that they legalized same-sex marriage 
on a national level, but did make some fairly significant changes to existing law (in the 
case of Windsor) and set precedent making it more difficult for opponents of same-sex 
marriage to challenge legalization in courts (Perry), they affect the political environment 
within which activism groups operate. 
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 My hypothesis is that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Perry have 
already affected the strategies of marriage equality organizations, and/or have affected 
the political environment in a way that organizations can either use to their advantage or 
that puts them at more of a disadvantage relative to pre-Windsor and Perry. This 
contributes to the literature on the topic of the Supreme Court as an actor of social change 
in a more novel way by examining not only the way in which the decisions in Perry and 
Windsor have potentially encouraged one side of the same-sex marriage debate, but also 
the way in which they have potentially made activism more challenging for the other 
side. This both avoids the direct cause-and-effect approach favored by Rosenberg, which 
has significant flaws when it comes to acknowledging many of the nuances of political 
and social change, but also potentially extends McCann’s theory by focusing on another 
issue in which judicial action may influence the operations of activist groups.  
 
Methodology 
 To support my claim, I have conducted interviews with members of 
administrative leadership in LGBT rights activism organizations. In these interviews, I 
asked a series of questions about how the decisions in Windsor and Perry have affected 
organizational strategies, and what, if any, change in the political structure has been 
perceived by the members of the organization. While I am not looking at direct social 
change by the Supreme Court as a phenomenon that definitely does or definitely does not 
exist, I think that the perception of it existing can affect how organizations structure their 
activist activities within their communities. I also asked respondents if they think that the 
decisions have affected how their opposition can operate going forward, and how their 
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ability to operate has been helped or hindered. Respondents have not been identified by 
name, but I have listed the names of the organizations and provided a brief description of 
each one. A list of questions that were asked of respondents can be found in the appendix. 
 By receiving responses from a variety of activist groups, I have been able to gain 
a good idea of the general current of organizational change, change to the political 
environment, or lack thereof. I have interviewed members of organizations that operate 
both on a national and state level, which provided a breadth of information from which I 
have been able to conduct analysis and draw my conclusions. I have attempted to reach 
the broadest base possible of organizations by reaching out to prominent national 
marriage equality groups, the top marriage equality organization in each state that has not 
legalized same-sex marriage, and the top marriage equality group in states that have 
legalized marriage equality since the decisions were released in June 2013. I have 
included feedback from the groups that responded to my request for an interview. I also 
attempted to reach out to several anti-marriage equality organizations in order to get a 
sense of how Windsor and Perry have affected activism on both sides of the issue, but did 
not receive responses from any of the organizations that I contacted. While this 
information is by no means all encompassing, it provides enough breadth to spot trends 
and commonalities or divergences within each sub-category of activist organizations.   
 I believe that interviews are the best way to approach my inquiry and analysis 
purely due to the nature of my research. Since I wanted to study how the Supreme Court 
indirectly creates social change by affecting activism strategies and the political 
environment, the most direct way to determine if activist groups acknowledge that their 
strategies are affected by Court decisions, or if they have perceived a change in the 
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political environment, was to ask them their thoughts on the matter in order to assess the 
perceived openings and closings in the political structure caused by the decisions. If they 
believe that their strategies or the political environment have been measurably affected by 
the decisions in Windsor and Perry, then my hypothesis will be supported. Merely doing 
research of past cases would not provide the direct examination of the subject that I think 
is necessary in this type of inquiry.  
 
Organization 
 This project will be organized in such a way as to 1) show that the LGBT rights 
movement has seen changes in the political environment in the past, both negative and 
positive, due to non-marriage related Supreme Court litigation; 2) show that Rosenberg’s 
analysis of litigation and same-sex marriage is both outdated and much too narrowly 
focused; and 3) show that the Supreme Court decisions in Hollingsworth v. Perry and 
United States v. Windsor have directly caused activist organizations to change their 
organizational strategies, or have influenced the political environment in a way that 
activists has made their activism more effective.  
 Chapter Two will look more in-depth at the social organization theory on which I 
am basing my argument of changing political environments, examine how LGBT rights 
litigation in the past has affected the political environment for LGBT activism, and push 
back on Rosenberg’s analysis of same-sex marriage and litigative strategies. Chapter 
Three will feature brief overviews of the organizations that I have interviewed, including 
their goals and specific strategies, and discuss whether or not those strategies have 
changed in the wake of the decisions in Perry and Windsor. Chapter Four will analyze 
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more thoroughly the data that I have gathered from the interview in order to identify 
trends and consensus among organizations regarding changes to the political 
environment, and how these changes have affected marriage equality activism and will 
continue to affect it going forward. In the concluding chapter, I will review the evidence 
and analysis to come to my final conclusion, which is that while organizational strategies 
have not significantly changed, the political environment in which organizations operate 
has; and why this is important for understanding the Supreme Court’s effect on social 
change and its role in the American political arena, particularly in the area of same-sex 
marriage.  
 
Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have laid out the background of the Supreme Court decisions in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, hopefully to help to understand the 
perceived or real influence of these decisions at the time of their release. I have also 
explained why the question of whether or not the Supreme Court affects social change is 
important, and whether it can produce indirect social changes that have effects that are 
just as important as direct social change. I have outlined the various arguments 
surrounding the question of the efficacy of the Court to affect change, why my approach 
will add to this literature in a meaningful and productive way, and why my methodology 
is the best way to achieve my particular goals.  
 To begin to tackle the question that is laid out before me for my research, I must 
first look at the historical precedent that exists for believing that Supreme Court decisions 
have affected the political environment surrounding LGBT activism in general, and 
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discuss why Rosenberg’s analysis of the situation is flawed based on ignorance of the 
indirect effects of early marriage equality litigation. I hope to convince the reader that 
these effects are and have been significant, particularly within the politically mainstream 
gay rights and marriage equality movements.  
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Chapter 2: Framework 
 
 In the introductory chapter, I briefly discussed Gerald Rosenberg’s theory that the 
Supreme Court can never affect social change through its decisions, whether directly or 
indirectly. For him, this theory extends to the fight for same-sex marriage; he argues that 
litigation has never helped, and has perhaps hurt, the push for marriage equality. His 
analysis of the courts and marriage equality only goes up until 2004 (and was published 
in 2008), long before any of the federal court cases were even filed, but his analysis of 
the state courts and litigation is as grim as his analysis of federal court involvement in the 
civil rights movement and the feminist movement. While I am not seeking to challenge 
Rosenberg’s assertion that the courts cannot affect social change directly, I am 
challenging his assertion that the courts cannot even affect social change indirectly 
through the influence of public opinion, legislators, activism and other more “effective” 
vehicles for social change. While I will be getting into the specifics of my argument – 
that the Supreme Court decisions in Perry and Windsor have affected the political 
environment in which activism operates – in later chapters, this chapter will explore more 
deeply Rosenberg’s arguments on why litigation has not been useful to the marriage 
equality movement and LGBT rights in general, and will push back on his argument 
through a framework of social organization theory, historical evidence of court decisions 
affecting the environment in which LGBT activism has operated, and events within the 
LGBT rights and marriage equality movement that have occurred since his 2004 analysis. 
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Social Organization Theory 
 When I say that I will be using the framework of social organization theory, I 
mean that I will be using Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s theory of 
contentious politics and how social events can alter the political atmosphere in which 
contentious politics are occurring, which I touched on very briefly in the previous 
chapter. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly define contentious politics as, “episodic, public, 
collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one 
government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims 
would, if realized, affect the interest of at least one of the claimants.”17 In this case, the 
claimants involved are the LGBT community and the governments of the individual 
states and the United States federally. While the LGBT rights movement was originally a 
fully transgressive contention, which means that one or more of the parties is a new 
political actor or is using unprecedented means, it would now be classified as 
increasingly contained contention, wherein “all parties are established actors employing 
well-established means of claim making.”18 Certainly, there still remain some elements of 
the movement that could be classified as transgressive, but overall, this change in 
classification itself shows how the landscape of LGBT rights activism has changed since 
it first appeared as a cohesive movement. 
 A useful tool provided by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly in regards to 
understanding how Supreme Court decisions can affect social change through indirect 
channels is the following question: “How, and how much, does [an event] affect: (a) 
opportunity bearing on potential actors, (b) mobilizing structures that promote 
                                                
17 McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 5 
18 McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 7 
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communication, coordination, and commitment within and among potential actors, (c) 
framing processes that produce shared definitions of what is happening?”19 For my 
purposes, the event in question would be the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. 
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry and how they affect the political environment for 
LGBT activism in the realm of marriage equality as defined by (a), (b), and (c), but also 
in regards to any other important factors that appeared in my interviews with respondents 
from various LGBT activist organizations. These effects to the political environment can 
be either hindering or helpful, as both would affect the way in which activism is 
conducted and received.  
 
Indirect Effects of Litigation on the Broader LGBT Rights Movement 
 While Rosenberg focuses his analysis of litigation and LGBT rights solely on 
marriage equality, the push for marriage equality is not the first time that LGBT activists 
have seen effects on the political environment in which they are operating from court 
decisions. While effects, both direct and indirect, have come from more obvious cases 
like Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas, all of which I will 
discuss, they have also come from less obvious cases like Griswold v. Connecticut. 
Griswold’s new finding to a constitutional right to privacy caused the American Civil 
Liberties Union to reconsider its stance on governmental legal restrictions on 
homosexuality itself. Previously, the ACLU had refused to get involved in burgeoning 
LGBT activism, and its support, however limited, was an enormous boon for the 
                                                
19 McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 17-18 
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movement,20 and has provided the LGBT community with an ally that has been 
incredibly important over the years. This could be an example of what McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly refer to as “production of shared definitions” with regard to framing, which is 
the process by which movements define and present themselves and their aims.21 The 
Court’s decision in Griswold changed the way in which the ACLU viewed LGBT rights 
in a way that, to them, justified their newfound involvement with the movement.  
 While Bowers was definitely a blow to the LGBT community in an extremely 
direct way, with its ruling that a fundamental right for consenting adults to engage in 
same-sex sodomy was not protected under the Constitution.22 The 1986 ruling also had 
indirect effects, both negative and positive, on the LGBT rights movement at the time. 
Negatively, it made some aspects of activism more difficult for the movement, as many 
lower court judges used the decision in order to justify various discriminatory practices. 
On the other hand, Bowers made LGBT rights much more visible across the country; 
resulted in an outpouring of financial support to groups like Lambda Legal, allowing 
them to expand; and inspired the ACLU to form the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, 
which was the first national civil rights movement to endorse marriage equality.23 
Bowers’ legal precedent was unarguably a hindrance to the movement, but the backlash 
from supporters of LGBT rights provided a small silver lining to an otherwise very 
unfortunate ruling. This isn’t to say that Bowers would not have been much more helpful 
to the LGBT movement had it been decided differently, but simply that the loss in the 
court was not, in retrospect, a total loss for the movement. 
                                                
20 Klarman, Michael., 6 
21 McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 16-18 
22 Bowers v. Hardwick. 
23 Klarman, Michael., 38 
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 Romer and Lawrence were both victories for the LGBT movement, and both 
cases also affected the political environment in which activism was being conducted in 
addition to their more overt positives. Romer – which in 1996 struck down a Colorado 
state constitutional amendment preventing any anti-discrimination ordinances from 
applying to LGBT individuals within the state under the argument that simple animus 
was the main motivation for the amendment’s passage24 – deterred similar referenda from 
being attempted in the future, marked a rejection of moral disapproval as a legitimate 
reason for discrimination against LGBT individuals, and was the first example of the 
Supreme Court defending LGBT rights.25 Deterring the opposition from attempting 
similar referenda in the future meant that LGBT activist groups did not have to spend 
their time fighting such ballot measures, which could have taken up a significant chunk 
of their energy and resources had such referenda caught on across the country. The 
Supreme Court showing emerging support for LGBT rights (from Justice Kennedy’s first 
of now three opinions expressing such support) under the argument that moral 
disapproval did not justify discrimination was a turning point for the LGBT movement 
legally and culturally; since the Court does not like to get too far ahead of public opinion, 
this decision was an indicator that the overall trend was towards more recognition of 
LGBT rights. This broader significance means that the ruling, which may seem to mainly 
have affected Colorado, had a much wider affect on the political environment across the 
country.  
 Finally, in 2003, Lawrence overturned the ruling in Bowers, holding that a Texas 
anti-sodomy law targeting consensual same-sex relations violated the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.26 This opinion also focused on the idea of moral disapproval not being a 
sufficient state interest for such a discriminatory law, and that a law like this would only 
be passed with animus as the intent, following the precedent set by Romer. The main 
change to the political environment affected by Lawrence was an even greater focus on 
recognition of same-sex relationships and eventual marriage equality;27 this new focus on 
marriage equality was heightened due to the Goodridge litigation in Massachusetts 
during the same year. This heightened awareness signaled the shift to a focus on marriage 
equality as an actually attainable goal – perhaps not any time in the near future, or even 
perhaps in the next twenty years, but certainly within the lifetimes of the activists 
working on the issue at the time. At the same time, it heavily mobilized the opposition, 
with religious conservatives calling for a federal constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage, which President George W. Bush supported.28 Fortunately, this 
amendment never gained any real traction in Congress, but it definitely marked the shift 
in the public consciousness towards focusing on LGBT relationship recognition and the 
eventuality of marriage equality.  
While Rosenberg does not discuss any of the above-mentioned cases in his 
analysis of litigation and marriage equality, these form a solid basis for the claim that 
litigation has been extremely important in shaping the political environment of LGBT 
activism, even if the litigation’s direct effects were not what Rosenberg would qualify as 
“significant social change.” 
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Baehr, Baker, and Goodridge: Rosenberg’s Analysis of Early Marriage Equality 
Litigation 
 Rosenberg focuses heavily on the Hawaii same-sex marriage cases: Baehr v. 
Lewin in 1993, which ruled that the state’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage 
without a compelling reason violated the state’s equal protection guarantee; and Baehr v. 
Miike in 1996, which ordered the Department of Health to begin issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.29 Rosenberg focuses mainly on the backlash that these 
cases inspired from the opposition to marriage equality, which was very successful due to 
a very low level of public support for same-sex marriage at the time – 68% of Americans 
opposed gay marriage in 1993.30 Rosenberg is not wrong about the backlash, or the fact 
that these cases were probably ill-conceived and much too far ahead of public opinion to 
be successful – in the wake of the two Baehr cases, states started passing anti-marriage 
equality state amendments and statutes, which had not really existed prior to the Hawaii 
cases. They also inspired the federal legislature to pass the Defense of Marriage Act, or 
DOMA, in 1996, which marked the first time that the federal government had gotten 
involved in the definition of marriage, a category traditionally left to the states.31 Hawaii 
voters eventually passed a state constitutional amendment in 1998 that gave the state 
legislature the power to define marriage however they chose for the state, which at that 
time was defined as between a man and a woman only.32 
While Rosenberg is right that these cases caused a lot of issues for the LGBT rights 
movement, and created barriers to marriage equality that had not previously existed, he 
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misstates that these cases were part of the strategy for LGBT rights activist organizations 
at the time, as most political strategists involved with the movement thought that these 
cases would galvanize the opposition, that litigative strategies should be saved for the 
future, and that marriage was not a realistic short-term goal.33 He also glosses over the 
various benefits that these cases did provide for the LGBT community and for the 
trajectory of marriage equality in the United States. The same ballot measure that Hawaii 
voters passed creating the amendment allowing the state legislature to define marriage 
(which, incidentally, was a very generous wording compared to other state amendments 
barring same-sex marriage) also granted sixty out of the 160 state benefits associated 
with marriage to registered same-sex couples, including property rights, hospital 
visitation and health care decisions, and inheritance without a will.34 Rosenberg deems 
this a failure through the lens of marriage equality as the end goal. But considering that 
marriage equality was not yet a strategic aim of LGBT organizations at the time, these 
benefits were an amazing step forward for the LGBT community in Hawaii. The cases 
also put marriage equality into the public consciousness and put it more on the radar of 
LGBT activists in general.35 While public support was still extremely low, it made 
marriage equality an option for future activism in a way that it had not been before, and 
got people to start talking about it. 
Now that marriage equality was at least on the table, other state-level litigation started 
popping up, with the most notable being Baker v. Vermont in 1999 and Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health (Massachusetts) in 2003. Rosenberg dismisses Baker’s 
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effectiveness because it only produced civil unions in Vermont as opposed to marriage 
equality.36 This is another example of the issues that arise with Rosenberg’s broad 
definition of significant social change and a fairly static end-point. Civil unions like the 
ones created in Vermont were unprecedented; they gave same-sex couples that entered 
them all of the state marriage benefits, simply without the title.37 This was seen as an 
enormous victory in the LGBT community, even if Rosenberg does not see it as such. 
Vermont later became the first state to legalize marriage equality through legislative 
means in 2009.38 
 Rosenberg’s analysis of Goodridge is one where time has not done him any 
favors in terms of strengthening his argument. His argument against its effectiveness was 
weak at best even in the political climate of 2008 – he acknowledges that the state 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in Massachusetts was unlikely to 
come to fruition, and falls back on the fact that same-sex couples married on a state level 
still did not enjoy federal benefits.39 The federal benefits aspect is an argument entirely 
separate from the success of the goals of the Goodridge litigation, which were achieved, 
and has also since been rendered a moot point following Windsor. Goodridge seems to be 
a clear example where it would be easy to say, even under Rosenberg’s strict system of 
constraints and conditions, that litigation produced significant social change on a direct 
level, while also having indirect effects. The most significant indirect effect of Goodridge 
and legalized same-sex marriage, even on the level of one state, was that it started 
dismantling the opposition’s argument that same-sex marriage would lead to societal 
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decay and cause opposite-sex marriages to suffer, and allowed the public its first look at 
stable same-sex couples and families. 
Finally, Rosenberg looks at some of the indirect effects that he acknowledges 
litigation may be able to have, including an effect on public opinion. He notes the 
significant increase in public support for LGBT rights over the past few decades, but 
emphasizes that, “Importantly, these changes are not primarily the result of litigation. 
Rather, the are the result of a changing culture.”40 This observation is certainly true to an 
extent, but it ignores the fact that the process of changing public opinion is cyclical, and 
that events build on each other and do not occur in a vacuum. As I pointed out above, 
Goodridge influenced public opinion in favor of same-sex marriage on some level by 
making the idea of a married same-sex couple more normalized and removing the bite of 
arguments that legalized marriage equality would lead to some sort of societal collapse. 
Opposition to marriage equality within a state, unlike opposition to abortion and Roe v. 
Wade, seems to significantly decrease once marriage equality has been implemented, and 
sometimes the most efficient way to implement it is through a litigative pathway. This 
was certainly the case in Iowa, which was one of the more surprising states to legalize 
same-sex marriage early on in 2009. The state Supreme Court ruled in favor of marriage 
equality, and despite unfavorable public opinion towards same-sex marriage in the state, 
the democratically controlled state legislature refused to start the process to overturn the 
ruling. With no options to re-restrict marriage to heterosexual couples only, the 
opposition eventually just stopped pushing back despite public opinion initially being in 
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their favor.41 Thus, litigation, legislation, and cultural shifts all play important roles, with 
each influencing the others.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that even if one accepts Rosenberg’s argument that litigation 
can never really affect significant social change, there have been many key indirect 
effects of litigation on the political environment in which LGBT activism has operated, 
making a case for litigation affecting social change through more indirect channels. 
Would Rosenberg’s analysis of same-sex marriage and litigation be different were he to 
release an updated edition of his argument today? It is impossible to know for sure, but I 
could see him potentially arguing that Windsor and Perry were not examples of court 
decisions creating significant social change; Perry on the argument that it only directly 
affected California, and Windsor on the argument that it did not, in fact, legalize same-
sex marriage on a national level. However, could he argue that these cases have not had a 
significant indirect effect, namely by changing the political environment in which LGBT 
activism is currently operating? I will explore this issue in depth in the following chapters 
by looking at the ways in which respondents that I interviewed from several LGBT rights 
organizations say that the decisions have changed the landscape in which they are 
fighting for equality.  
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Chapter Three: Organizational Profiles and Changes in Strategy 
 
While it seems that there is a precedent for Supreme Court decisions indirectly 
affecting LGBT activism – perhaps first with the effect that Griswold v. Connecticut and 
the finding of a right to privacy had in encouraging the ACLU to begin assisting with 
litigation in the gay rights movement – it is important to determine if the most recent 
Supreme Court decisions in United States and Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry have 
had an effect on current activism efforts. I decided that the most effective way to 
determine this was to interview leadership members of LGBT rights groups and see what 
their perspectives were in terms of how their strategies have, or have not, changed in the 
wake of the decisions, and if they have perceived any change, positive or negative, in the 
political environment in which they conduct their activism.   
My goal for the interviews that I conducted was to gather a breadth of information 
from a variety of different organizations that perform activism campaigns for marriage 
equality and other LGBT issues. These organizations fell into four main categories: 
national organizations and state-based organizations. Among the state organizations, 
there were those from states that have not yet legalized marriage equality and those from 
states who have seen marriage equality legalized since the Supreme Court handed down 
their decisions in Perry and Windsor on June 26, 2013. I wanted to look at both national 
and state organizations to see if responses and reactions to the decisions varied based on 
organization scale, scope, or focus. Among the state organizations, I chose states that 
have not yet legalized marriage equality to see how their strategies may have changed 
going forward or how they view the political environment as having changed as they 
continue to push for marriage equality and other LGBT rights. I spoke to states that have 
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legalized marriage equality since the decisions came down to determine if the decisions 
had any direct effect, in their mind, on marriage equality becoming legal in their states, 
and how exactly the decisions were able to assist them in pushing forward in the 
legalization process. I chose not to interview organizations in states that had legalized 
marriage equality before the decisions – while those organizations are still working hard 
on LGBT issues that have yet to be solved in their own state and across the country, my 
focus was on marriage equality and how that particular area of activism was shaped by 
the Court’s decisions. In an attempt to gather data from both sides of the marriage 
equality debate, I did try to get in contact with several anti-marriage equality 
organizations, including Family Research Council, the Thomas Moore Law Center, 
Concerned Women for America, and the National Organization for Marriage. However, I 
was unable to get in contact with anyone at these organizations to schedule an interview. 
This chapter will provide a look into each of the ten organizations from which I was 
able to interview a representative. On the national side of things, I interviewed 
respondents from Equality Federation, American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER), 
Marriage Equality USA, and the National Equality Action Team (NEAT), a subsidiary 
organization of Marriage Equality USA. On the state side of things, I interviewed 
respondents from Equality Texas, Equality Ohio, Equality North Carolina, Equality 
Alabama, Equality Illinois, and Equality Hawaii. I will briefly describe the background 
and goals of each organization before moving on to discussing whether these 
organizations’ strategies seem to have changed since the decisions, and if so, how. The 
information that I gathered from the interviews regarding changes in the political 
environment will be analyzed in more depth in the following chapter. I will start with the 
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national organizations before moving onto the state organizations, which will further be 
organized between states which had not yet legalized marriage equality at the time of our 
interview, and states that had seen legalized marriage equality in the time between the 
June 26 decisions and our discussion. I will then look at some of the strategies that 
organizations have said that they are using in the continuing push for marriage equality.   
 
National Organizations 
Equality Federation 
Equality Federation is a national organization that functions quite differently from 
most national LGBT organizations – while they do focus somewhat on marriage equality 
and other LGBT issues on a national level, they put most of their energy into helping 
state organizations with their local campaigns, as they believe that change starts through 
grassroots activism in local communities.42 Many state-level organizations are also 
member organizations of the federation; all of the state organizations that I spoke with 
count themselves as members. Equality Federation lends assistance to state organizations 
through providing them with resources, including counsel regarding specific state issues, 
helping to train leadership and instruct state leaders on how to run a successful 
organization, and developing policy programs for states at all different levels of the fight 
for LGBT equality.43 In the words of my respondent from the organization, “We back 
momentum in the state for winning the freedom to marry, and our role is to strengthen 
those state-based organizations that are making the push to win marriage.”44 They 
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contribute to national efforts, such as advocating before Congress or the President, but 
their focus is on changing the hearts and minds of local communities and legislators.  
 
American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER) 
 The American Foundation for Equal Rights, or AFER, was founded in 2009 as the 
sole sponsor for the litigation in the various Perry cases. The organization’s goal is “full 
federal marriage equality for all Americans,” and they are currently pursuing a federal 
court case in Virginia challenging that state’s Marriage Amendment,45 which bars same-
sex marriage (and which was struck down as unconstitutional by a federal judge in 
February 2014).46 AFER focuses solely on litigative tactics as an organization in the fight 
to win marriage equality.  
 
Marriage Equality USA 
 Marriage Equality USA supports the national movement for marriage equality 
through a variety of methods, including assisting state organizations with their campaigns 
for marriage equality, media campaigns to tell people about the personal stories of those 
affected by marriage discrimination, community gatherings and rallies to raise awareness, 
and educational outreach to educate the public about the realities and benefits of marriage 
equality.47 My respondent from the organization noted that organizational activities 
surrounding the decisions had included organizing outside of the federal courthouse and 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco during the trials and decisions in 
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Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Perry v. Brown, and in Washington D.C. before the 
decisions were released in Hollingsworth v. Perry and Windsor. This served the purpose 
both of being at the scene of the action when the decisions were released and being able 
to provide a public face of the issue to the media.48 Getting as many personal stories into 
the public eye as possible to encourage greater understanding and change hearts and 
minds is one of the organization’s main focuses. This led them to contribute an amicus 
brief to the Supreme Court for the Perry case, which placed minimum emphasis on legal 
argumentation and centered mainly on the stories of couples that had experienced “both 
the joy of marriage, as well couples who had experienced the pain of having it denied.”49 
My respondent also noted that some of the language used by Justice Kennedy in the 
Windsor decision strongly echoed the language and sentiment that Marriage Equality 
USA had put into their brief.   
 
National Equality Action Team (NEAT) 
The National Equality Action Team, or NEAT, is a subsidiary of Marriage 
Equality USA focused on assisting local organizations with their campaigns for marriage 
equality by providing volunteers and other resources. In their own words, “NEAT 
supports and works with state leaders of active marriage equality campaigns by 
recruiting, training, and supporting volunteers from across the country.”50 This means 
using recruited volunteers to engage in voter contact – mainly in the form of phone 
banking, as most volunteers are located outside of the states in which the campaigns are 
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taking place – in order to provide assistance to individual state campaigns.51 While 
Marriage Equality USA is looking more at activism and changes on the national level, 
NEAT is more focused on winning states and building a critical mass of states that have 
legalized marriage equality.  
 
State Organizations 
Equality Texas 
 Equality Texas, like all of the other state organizations that I interviewed, is a 
member organization of Equality Federation. The organization consists of two 
components: Equality Texas Foundation, which conducts polling and educates the 
citizens of Texas regarding policies and their effects on the LGBT community; and 
Equality Texas, which lobbies the Texas legislature to pass bills that help prevent 
discrimination against LGBT identified people and repeal discriminatory laws.52 My 
respondent from the organization said that while they are definitely working on marriage 
in Texas, most of their focus is currently on other issues affecting LGBT Texans, 
including extending Texas’s affirmative defense law – a legal defense for teenaged 
couples accused of indecent activities with a minor while in a consensual relationship – to 
apply to same-sex couples as well as opposite-sex couples.53  
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Equality Ohio 
 Equality Ohio was founded in response to the state constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage and civil unions in 2005. The organization focuses on 
“changing hearts and minds” of Ohioans on the issue of marriage equality, and does a lot 
of organizing around legislative measures in the Ohio legislature.54 As stated by my 
respondent from the organization, “Currently [our main goal regarding marriage equality] 
is to educate Ohioans on the importance of respecting the dignity of all marriages.”55 
 
Equality North Carolina 
 Equality North Carolina is made up of three different sub-branches: Equality NC, 
the parent organization focused on lobbying in the legislature; Equality NC Action fund, 
a PAC that works to fund the campaigns of candidates favorable to LGBT rights; and 
Equality NC Foundation, which focuses on education regarding LGBT issues in the state 
of North Carolina.56 My respondent works with both Equality NC and Equality NC 
Foundation. Their work has become more challenging in recent years due to a political 
shift in the North Carolina legislature that made the governing body overwhelmingly 
conservative.57 
 
Equality Alabama 
 Equality Alabama works to promote equality for LGBT individuals “where they 
work, where they live, where they learn, and where they play” – this means focusing on 
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workplace discrimination, public accommodation discrimination, school anti-bullying 
initiatives, and promoting equality in the social sphere.58 Equality Alabama lobbies the 
Alabama legislature in order to promote equality issues, and has recently been building a 
business coalition by focusing on the ways in which increased equality for the LGBT 
community in the state would benefit Alabama and all of its citizens economically.59 
 
Equality Illinois 
 Illinois is one of the several states that have seen legalized marriage equality since 
the Supreme Court handed down their decisions in Windsor and Perry in June 2013. This 
certainly doesn’t mean that Equality Illinois’s work is done – as the oldest equality 
organization in Illinois, founded in 1991, the organization is involved with a variety of 
other issues that affect LGBT individuals in the state besides marriage.60 However, up 
until the Illinois legislature passed the Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act in 
November, Equality Illinois was heavily involved in ensuring that the bill passed through 
lobbying legislators and educating the voters of Illinois that marriage equality mattered.  
  
Equality Hawaii 
 Equality Hawaii, the final organization I interviewed, focuses mainly on 
legislative lobbying and educating the citizens of Hawaii about LGBT equality issues 
through methods like media campaigns and one-on-one discussions.61 As one of the 
states to pass marriage equality following the June decisions, the organization has also 
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been able to focus more of their energy on key equality measures in recent months: 
currently, they are working on a comprehensive safe-school bill that gives a 
comprehensive plan for preventing bullying in schools, especially based on gender 
identity and sexual orientation.62 However, before marriage passed in the state, they were 
involved with the legislation and lobbying every step of the way.  
 
Strategies 
National Organizations 
 Overall, the sense that I took away from the interviews is that broader strategies 
have not changed significantly in the wake of Windsor and Perry, although tactics for 
carrying out these strategies may have shifted. My respondent from Equality Federation 
said that while the decisions have not affected Equality Federation’s larger strategies of 
working with state organizations on their local campaigns, for marriage equality as well 
as other LGBT issues, he noted that he had seen an uptick in state court cases across the 
country. “At this point, there’s a case in nearly every state. Prior to the decisions, we 
were not working with our state groups around how to be involved with a court case. 
Post-decisions, that is absolutely the reality we’re in; state-based organizations… are 
dealing with these court cases… but because they are not legal groups, they come to us 
for guidance and expertise on how they can better support the legal efforts that are in 
play.”63 This would be an example of tactics shifting – the focus has become more 
litigation-centered – without the overall strategy of supporting state-based organizations 
changing.  
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 My AFER respondent said that since the organization’s focus is on litigation, the 
strategies of the organization have not changed, although they would likely be focusing 
on different issues if the Supreme Court had decided the Perry case on its merits in a way 
that extended marriage equality to the country as a whole. My respondent from AFER did 
speak to the way that their case has, in his eyes, affected marriage equality litigation, 
however: “When we went to trial, it was the first time that this issue was put on trial [in 
federal court], and so now there’s precedent out there… since our case was filed, now 
you have sixteen or seventeen other cases in other states that have been filed in federal 
court.”64 This would indicate a shift in general strategies across the movement for 
winning marriage equality, even if AFER as an organization has largely stayed with the 
same strategies.  
NEAT’s respondent said that she thought that the decisions in Windsor and Perry 
had not directly affected NEAT’s organizational strategies – similar to what was said by 
Equality Federation. “The strategy before and the strategy after is, we want to win way 
more states, if we win more states, then the Supreme Court will feel safer doing what 
they eventually, legally and constitutionally, will do.”65 She does believe that the 
Supreme Court will ultimately decide the national solution regarding marriage equality, 
as many states will be recalcitrant to the bitter end. She says that given this stubbornness 
from certain states, winning a critical mass of states before that final decision will help 
prevent significant backlash from opponents: “In Roe v. Wade in 1973, and Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954, the Supreme Court was seen as being ahead of the country, 
or taking too much of an activist position on a social issues, and so some argue that what 
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that does is that it stops conversation, it stops the consensus building process.”66 
Avoiding extreme backlash at this stage in the marriage equality movement is crucial, 
since backlash against marriage rights would likely lead to significant backlash against, 
and difficulty attaining, other extremely significant rights for the LGBT community, 
including many transgender rights and non-discrimination rights. The backlash caused 
across the country by the 1993 and 1996 decisions in Baehr, discussed in the previous 
chapter, shows the challenging consequences that a premature decision on marriage 
equality could bring about. NEAT’s focus on building a strong critical mass on a state-
by-state basis reflects this caution regarding pushing the Supreme Court to make a 
decision that would potentially not fit well with public opinion. 
In general, it seems that national organizational strategies stayed largely the same 
in the wake of the decisions, something that held true with state organizations as well. 
There are some notable points, however: the strategy of “changing hearts and minds,” 
and the difference in political opportunities between states that have since legalized 
marriage equality and states that have yet to do so.  
 
Changing Hearts and Minds 
“Changing hearts and minds” was the phrase that kept appearing repeatedly in 
interviews when respondents described what their current strategies are for promoting 
marriage equality. This strategy focuses on sharing personal stories of members of the 
LGBT community who are affected by the issue of same-sex marriage; stories might 
entail a discussion of how much being able to marry has improved the life of the family 
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of an LGBT couple, or how the inability to marry is harming an LGBT couple by making 
hospital visitation or end-of-life arrangements more difficult. These stories are aimed at 
both the general public, in order to further facilitate the cultural shift that the country has 
seen over the past decade, as well as the legislators who may be presented with 
legislation that affects the LGBT community. While personal stories are usually the basis 
of the changing hearts and minds strategy, each organization had a slightly different take 
on the tactic.  
My respondent at Equality Federation says that the organization continues to be 
very focused on furthering the cultural shift that the country has seen on same-sex 
marriage by continuing to change hearts and minds, which my respondent did say has 
been helped by the decisions: “What the court decision did was create an additional level 
of consciousness in the public around this issue, and it gave LGBT people a platform to 
talk about their families as the case was working its way through.” Thus, while the 
organizational strategies of Equality Federation remain the same as they were prior to the 
decisions in Perry and Windsor, the specifics of these strategies have shifted into new 
arenas and the decisions have made it easier for the organization to get their message 
across to the average voter, something that I will explore more in-depth next chapter.  
Changing prevalent public opinion is especially important in Texas, where 
demographic shifts have led to increased support for marriage equality overall, but where 
older and whiter demographics tend to remain opposed.67 One way in which they are 
attempting to change hearts and minds is by appealing to the Texas sense of 
individualism and a mistrust of government being too involved in people’s personal lives, 
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which is an excellent argument when it comes to letting two adults in love get married.68 
By making marriage equality into an issue that traditional Texan values are consistent 
with, the organization hopes to convince people in the older demographics to reconsider 
their positions on the issue and reach majority support for marriage equality in the state. 
 Equality North Carolina has been using the tactic to complement litigative efforts 
in the state. The ACLU filed a lawsuit regarding the state’s same-sex marriage ban in 
federal court, which “uses much of the same language that Kennedy’s opinion did in the 
Windsor case.”69 While Equality NC is not actively partnered in the lawsuit, they are 
working in conjunction with the ACLU of North Carolina in providing the “much needed 
cultural campaign on the ground,” changing hearts and minds with personal stories of 
LGBT individuals, couples, and families.70 The cultural campaign is important even if 
marriage equality ends up being decided by the courts, either for the state or nationally, 
before it is decided by North Carolina’s elected officials or voters in order to minimize 
the challenges involved with actually enforcing legalized marriage equality and 
preventing negative backlash.71 
 
Differences in Political Opportunities 
The main variances that were reported to me in how strategies have or have not 
changed were mainly divided along political opportunity lines: high political opportunity 
(support for LGBT rights and marriage equality by public officials, favorable public 
opinion regarding same-sex marriage) and low political opportunity (public officials tend 
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to oppose marriage equality, low public support of same-sex marriage, difficult-to-
overturn constitutional bans in place). States in which marriage equality was seen as more 
widely acceptable even before the Supreme Court decisions were able to adjust existing 
strategies to push for marriage equality in the wake of Perry and Windsor (high political 
opportunity), while states with less progressive political environments often chose to 
focus the momentum towards more fundamental issues faced by the LGBT community 
(low political opportunity). 
 
Low Political Opportunity 
In general, organizations with low political opportunity in regards to legalizing 
marriage equality seemed to have changed their strategies very little, if at all. My 
Equality Texas respondent said that since the Texas legislature will not be meeting in 
2014 (it only meets in odd-numbered years), Equality Texas is still in the midst of 
determining how their strategies will change when it comes to pressuring the legislature 
to legalize marriage equality during its next session. The main challenge to marriage 
equality in Texas is the state’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, 
which was passed in 2005 and would require a very involved legislative process to 
overturn.72 This amendment has since been declared unconstitutional by a federal court 
judge, but it is being allowed to stand pending the appeals process.73 I will be further 
discussing the potential implications of this judicial action in the next chapter. 
Alabama has a ways to go in order to enact any sort of legislation or pass any 
ballot measure legalizing same-sex marriage due to the general political environment in 
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the state. However, my respondent says that some of the language used in the Windsor 
decision has been very useful when working on other equality initiatives: “There is a bill 
before our legislature now that relates to education… and when sex education is taught in 
schools, the curriculum still includes that homosexuality is a crime and a disease. 
Obviously we know that’s not fact, and we refer back to the Windsor case, specifically, to 
make the argument that they are depriving these students of fair and equal protection, and 
that this aspect of the curriculum should be removed completely.”74 To maximize 
support, the organization also has tried to move away from specifying equality measures 
as being LGBT rights issues, and has attempted to frame them more as general equality 
issues, the remedying of which can benefit the state a whole – a tactic which my 
respondent says has been helped by the language used in the Windsor opinion.75 This 
would be a clear example of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s concept of changing the 
“framing processes that produce shared definitions of what is happening.”76 
The fight for marriage equality is difficult in North Carolina due to Amendment 1, 
which passed in 2012, as well as the fact that there are no state-wide anti-discrimination 
laws for the workplace regarding sexual orientation – every state that has legalized 
marriage equality has first had a comprehensive anti-discrimination law on the books.77 
The decisions in Windsor and Perry have shifted the dialogue back to marriage in the 
state, whereas Equality NC had previously been putting most of their energy into fighting 
workplace discrimination. My respondent says that the organization has been using this 
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momentum around marriage to further the cause of other pro-equality issues in addition 
to marriage itself.78 
Finally, my respondent from Equality Ohio says that the organization’s strategies 
have changed in the sense that litigation seems to becoming more of a viable strategy 
when it comes to winning marriage equality than it was in the past, and is potentially 
becoming more viable than legislation within certain political environments. “It has 
allowed people to find cracks in the legal structure, using some of these arguments that 
came out of the cases.”79 In other ways, the decisions have only had very minimal effect 
strategies in the state; there is currently an equal split in Ohio in terms of public opinion 
regarding marriage equality, and both sides saw a bump of a few percentage points 
following the release of the decisions in June.80 Currently, he says, Equality Ohio is in the 
midst of trying to determine which avenue – litigative, legislative, or at the ballot box – is 
going to be the most successful going forward, and thus which avenue to put the most 
resources behind.81 The fact that Ohio even has a potential way forward right now for 
same-sex marriage to succeed in the state means that it has higher political opportunity 
than many of the other states in this category, but it still does not enjoy enough support 
from public officials or the general population to be categorized as having high political 
opportunity. States like Ohio could be said to be on more of a middle ground.   
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High Political Opportunity 
Organizations in states with higher political opportunity didn’t necessarily see 
their strategies change very much either, but they did see an opening in the political 
structure following the decisions in which their existing strategies could be used to obtain 
a successful outcome. My respondent from Illinois says that he thinks the decisions in 
Windsor and Perry, Windsor in particular, were incredibly helpful in the final push to 
legalize marriage equality in Illinois. “[Before the decisions], it was somewhat esoteric 
[to discuss legalizing marriage equality in the state when marriages would not be 
recognized federally]. There were more than 1,100 federal benefits and policies that 
affected married couples, and that were denied to same-sex couples, even if they were 
involved in a civil union in places like Illinois. And suddenly, with the Supreme Court 
decisions, this is not an esoteric discussion; same-sex couples could, in fact, take 
advantage of these benefits and policies if they wanted to get married.”82 The timing of 
the decisions in assisting with this push was crucial as well – the Illinois legislature had 
decided not to vote on the bill before session ended on May 31, 2013, and the movement 
did not want to lose the momentum that they had built up during the spring. The 
decisions allowed them to use new ammunition when it came to talking to legislators and 
voters as they waited for the bill to be brought to a vote in the fall – a strategy that 
ultimately paid off.83 
The respondent from Equality Hawaii says that the decisions in Windsor and 
Perry played a key role in marriage equality being passed this past autumn, the fall of 
2013. There had been a discussion of a marriage equality bill in the 2013 legislative 
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session, but due to in-fighting in the state House of Representatives, the bill was tabled – 
some representatives who were on the fence said that they needed the courts to come 
down with a decision in order to prevent a “patchwork of fifty versions of marriage.”84 
Once the decisions were released, however, Governor Neil Abercrombie called for the 
marriage issue to be resolved by the end of the year in order to allow Hawaii same-sex 
couples who wished to marry, but who would not receive federal benefits under the 
state’s civil union law, to have access to those benefits as soon as possible.85 Data 
collected by Hawaii United for Marriage also shows a six-point decrease in opposition to 
same-sex marriage, from 37% to 31% opposed, between January 2013 and August 2013; 
that large of a shift during the timeframe of when the rulings were released could point to 
public opinion being favorably affected by the content of the decisions.86 A main strategy 
that they used in order to convince legislators and the public to rethink their position on 
the issue was using personal stories; for instance, they focused on the story of a couple 
where one man was dying of prostate cancer, who might not live until 2014, and who was 
not healthy enough to take a trip to the mainland in order to get married in a state where 
marriage equality was recognized. They also gathered pro-equality quotes from state 
legislators who might not have been the most obvious supporters of marriage equality in 
order to show that a very wide variety of people can be in favor of same-sex marriage. 
All of this contributed to their success, and likely contributed to the 6% decline that the 
organization saw in public opposition between January 2013 and August 2013.87 
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Conclusions 
From this brief overview of the organizations interviewed, it is evident that there 
was a wide range of reactions to the decisions in Windsor and Perry, and that different 
organizations were affected in a variety of ways depending on the type of organization 
and, for state organizations, the political environment of the state in which the 
organization is located. While it seems that many groups have not overtly seen their 
strategies change in the wake of the decisions, some states (Hawaii, Illinois) saw the 
political environment clearly shift in their favor which allowed them to make a final push 
for legalization, and others with more restricted political opportunities (Alabama, Texas) 
saw more subtle shifts in their tactical approach to more fundamental LGBT issues that 
still leave a long road ahead to marriage equality, barring a sweeping Supreme Court case 
in the near future. Of course, the decisions are still recent enough that the organizations 
themselves may not entirely know if and how their strategies might change, or even how 
they may have subtly changed already. The next chapter will delve deeper into the trends 
and patterns that came through in the interviews, and will help to paint a clearer picture 
of how the Supreme Court decisions of June 2013 have affected the political environment 
in which political organization around marriage equality operates on a state and national 
level.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Changes to the Political Environment 
 
In the last chapter I looked briefly at the organizations that I interviewed, and gave an 
overview of how they have, or have not, changed their activism strategies since the 
decisions in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry in June 2013. The lack 
of strategy changes, however, does not mean that the Supreme Court decisions in these 
cases have not had an effect on marriage equality activism in the months following the 
decisions – the other element at play is changes to the political environment in which 
such activism operates in a way that makes it easier or more difficult for the 
organizations’ messages to come across to politicians and the general public (again, 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s theory of “framing” within social movements), affects the 
way in which they interact with the opposition, and affects the channels available to them 
for achieving their goals. 
In this chapter, I will be looking more in-depth at the changes in the political 
environment that were reported to me by the respondents that I interviewed at the various 
organizations in terms of both framing opportunities presented by the language used in 
the Supreme Court decisions (particularly Windsor) and new legal precedent that will aid 
future litigation and potentially hinder the opposition. I will start by discussing the more 
general changes in the political environment that the organizations have seen; these 
general observations will be divided into national and state categories to show 
comparisons and contrasts between the two levels of organization. I will then look at 
some broader patterns and common threads that I noted between the interviews on both a 
state and a national level, including how the opposition to marriage equality has changed 
its tactics and been affected by the decisions, and how the legal precedent set by Windsor 
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and Perry has shaped the political environment. Finally, I will look at the organizations’ 
responses regarding the overall importance of litigation in the marriage equality 
movement, their main strategies going forward, and some downsides for the general 
LGBT equality movement that may result from legalized marriage equality. 
 
General Changes 
National Organizations 
 National LGBT rights organizations, due to their scope and access to some of the 
top political decision makers, significantly influence the political environment that they 
are, in turn, affected by. For Marriage Equality USA, this effect came in the form of an 
amicus curiae brief that they submitted to the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry. 
This brief, instead of using extensive legal language and arguments, focused instead on 
personal stories of those who had “experienced the joy of marriage, and what it meant to 
them, as well as couples who had experienced the pain of having it denied.”88 While it 
cannot be said for certain that Justice Kennedy was directly referencing this brief with his 
opinion in Windsor, much of the language that he uses is reminiscent of the language 
used in the amicus brief.89 Arguments presented in the amicus brief include “the freedom 
to marry gives same-sex couples… a profound sense of dignity, respect, and belonging,” 
“marriage allows same-sex couples to communicate that they are a family,” and “even 
legally marriage same-sex couples are vulnerable as long as the United States 
Constitution does not protect their freedom to marry in every state.” 90 While Justice 
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Kennedy did not use this exact phrasing in his opinion, statements such as “when the 
State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its 
role and power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection 
of the class in their own community,” “[DOMA] makes it even more difficult for the 
children [of same-sex couples] to understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community and their daily lives,” and 
“DOMA undermines… state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples… 
that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition. This places 
same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage,” echo 
strongly the sentiments and language used in the amicus brief.91 
This language is another great example of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s 
“framing” concept, and could be an example of “production of shared definitions” by 
making the societal perception of same-sex couples more closely match the LGBT 
community’s perception of them. It allows the marriage equality movement to push their 
agenda forward in a way that focuses on human dignity and family values, both concepts 
that tend to resonate with the American public. My respondent from the organization 
indicates that this production of shared definitions is one of the reasons why the opinion 
is so helpful. Using the language of dignity and family cohesiveness in addition to the 
financial benefits of marriage helps to underscore the humanity of the issue.  
The American Foundation for Equal Rights, or AFER, was more directly involved 
in bringing about changes in the political environment, as they were the sole sponsors of 
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the Perry litigation from the district court level all the way up to the Supreme Court.92 
When they filed the suit in the Northern California federal district court, they were the 
first to file a suit involving marriage equality at the federal level, giving it the potential to 
be heard by the nation’s highest court, which it eventually was.93 Had they not brought 
the suit, only Windsor would have reached the Supreme Court, if it had been filed at all – 
Perry gave the LGBT rights movement more confidence that litigation could be a 
winning strategy for marriage equality. 
 Beyond the ways in which these national organizations affected the way the 
decisions came down, they have noticed changes to the political environment that the 
decisions have wrought. One of the main ones is an entirely new category of same-sex 
couple that can now feel safe in their decision to marry – couples where one partner is not 
a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. Prior to the Windsor decision, such couples were 
discouraged from getting married, even in states where marriage equality existed, 
because the federal government would not recognize the marriage and could still choose 
to deport the non-citizen partner; marriage might even have hurt the couple’s cause 
during deportation hearings or other procedures.94 This new safety in marriage for “bi-
national” couples means that such couples in states where marriage equality is still not 
legal may be more inclined to help with the cause than they were before, since now they 
may feel that they have more at stake. Increased marriage rights may have also made gay 
couples feel more comfortable about being more open about their relationships with their 
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friends, coworkers, and family members in a way that influenced how those people felt 
about LGBT rights and marriage equality in particular.  
This newfound sense of identity with the marriage equality movement also 
extends to LGBT individuals who were not entirely enthused with the push for marriage 
equality when federal benefits were not a part of the picture, and same-sex marriage 
seemed like even more of a second-class version of marriage. With the federal benefits, 
says the Marriage Equality USA respondent, some of these individuals are more inclined 
to actively support and take part in the movement, which is a boon.95 This sentiment of an 
expanding circle of supporters was echoed by respondents from the National Equality 
Action Team (NEAT) and Equality Federation; extending even beyond previously 
disillusioned members of the LGBT community, the Supreme Court decisions, and 
Windsor in particular, have “created an additional level of consciousness on the issue,”96 
given organizations specific language that they can use to frame the issue of marriage 
equality, and “given a lot more credibility to the cause with the stamp of approval from 
the federal government.”97 
 My respondent from NEAT noted that there are also fewer and fewer institutional 
barriers to marriage equality: “Organizations like the military and the National Guard are 
starting to support marriage.”98 This shift may be partially due to the decisions, but partly 
due to the changing societal view of same-sex marriage as well; it is likely that the 
Supreme Court was somewhat influenced by a shift in the public opinion so great that the 
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United States military, an institution that is traditionally viewed as downright 
homophobic, has started to change its views.  
 Finally, in a telling bit of polling data, my respondent from Marriage Equality 
USA notes that while marriage equality has enjoyed majority support in nationwide polls 
in the recent past, the number of people polled who view marriage equality as 
“inevitable” is much higher than the number of those who support it; this means that 
there is a large number of people who oppose marriage equality but view it, ultimately, as 
inevitable. As my respondent notes, “that sense of inevitability may cause them to 
redirect their energy elsewhere.”99 
 
State Organizations 
 The national organizations certainly were not the only ones to notice shifts in the 
political environment – all of the state organizations I spoke with mentioned changes as 
well. Some of them were very direct; the legislative decisions legalizing marriage 
equality in Illinois and Hawaii during the fall of 2013 were both from bills that had been 
tabled in the spring prior to the release of the decisions, and the decisions were the 
impetus to bring those bills for a vote in the fall.100 In Hawaii, the governor even called 
for a special legislative session in order to have the marriage issue resolved “by the end 
of the year.”101 The decisions also gave Equality Illinois and Equality Hawaii a new 
arsenal of arguments to use with legislators and the general public heading into the 
legislative vote: the respondent from Equality Illinois said that arguments for state 
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marriage seemed “less esoteric” when there were federal benefits that could not be 
received by couples in civil unions, and that neighboring, married same-sex couples 
could have different benefits if one couple had chosen to get married out-of-state;102 the 
respondent from Equality Hawaii voiced similar experiences regarding the power of 
federal benefits being available, with an additional argument that it would create a new 
level of socio-economic inequality if the only couples in Hawaii who would be eligible 
for federal benefits were the ones who could afford to travel to the mainland to be 
married in a state that performed same-sex marriages.103 
 Organizations in states that still have yet to legalize marriage equality articulated 
less dramatic effects on the political environment, but noted that there were effects 
nonetheless. One of the main points from states in which marriage equality might be a bit 
more distant was that the arguments from the Supreme Court decision in Windsor and the 
district court decision in Perry were being applied to help argue for other LGBT issues. 
In North Carolina, where the political climate has “never been more conservative,”104 
discussion of marriage has nevertheless been on the forefront of the conversation 
regarding LGBT rights, especially since North Carolina’s state constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage, Amendment 1, passed in 2012 as a ballot measure. My 
respondent from Equality North Carolina says, “We’ve used marriage to get people 
involved with other LGBT issues, like workplace discrimination, bullying, and 
healthcare. Since Windsor, marriage has been on the forefront of everyone’s mind, and 
therefore the pro-equality movement has had to use that momentum to further other pro-
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equality issues.”105 As no states that have won marriage equality have done so without 
first having a workplace anti-discrimination law of some kind, this work is extremely 
crucial.106 My respondent from Equality Alabama similarly noted that the equal 
protection argument from Windsor was being used to further other key LGBT issues, 
particularly in an attempt to remove from the state sexual education curriculum that 
homosexuality is a crime and a disease.107 
 
Broad Trends 
Effect on Opposition 
General Effects 
 Nearly all of the organizations I spoke with noted that there had been some effect 
on the opposition to marriage equality as a result of the decisions in Windsor and Perry 
that had altered the political environment in some way. The respondent from Equality 
Hawaii says that some of the arguments previously used in favor of civil unions versus 
marriage are now much more tenuous with the new federal benefits: “When you look at 
[the rulings] in simplistic terms, what they did was they took away that last silver bullet 
for the people who were saying, ‘Well, why do we have to call it marriage? Why can’t 
we give you civil unions, domestic partnerships; we’ll give you rights, but reserve 
marriage for only opposite-sex couples. And when those rulings came down, and the 
federal government started to say, we’re now giving federal benefits to same-sex couples, 
but only if they’re married, it really exposed the whole two-tier concept [of having civil 
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unions as opposed to marriage for same-sex couples].”108 Taking away this argument 
from the opposition makes it much more difficult for an anti-marriage argument to be 
made without arguing against all rights for same-sex couples traditionally associated with 
marriage.  
 Other states have seen a variety of changes from the opposition. My respondent 
from Equality Texas says that the opposition there has moved from “ridicule to fight,” 
and has also started engaging in more trans-bashing, which is an unfortunate but perhaps 
unsurprising turn of events.109 Equality North Carolina’s respondent said that they had 
seen a new tactic of claiming that Amendment 1, which banned same-sex marriage in the 
state, was in fact a mandate against all rights for LGBT individuals, including workplace 
anti-discrimination laws.110 Respondents from both Equality Hawaii and AFER 
mentioned that the opposition’s new strategy appeared to be to stall or delay as long as 
possible when it comes to implementing marriage equality.111 This may signal 
desperation on the part of the opposition, which ties in with what was discussed earlier 
regarding the high number of people polled who view same-sex marriage as inevitable. 
While the opposition knows that marriage equality is going to happen eventually, they 
can try to put it off as long as possible in the meantime. 
 
Religious Exemptions 
 Religious exemptions were one category of recent oppositional tactics noted by 
several of the groups that I interviewed. Respondents from both Marriage Equality USA 
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and Equality Federation noted that they had seen an increase in religious exemptions 
being written into bills expanding LGBT rights or as bills on their own.112 My respondent 
from Equality Texas says that they have been using clergy members who support 
marriage equality in legislative hearings in order to counteract some of these new pushes 
for religious exemptions.113 This phenomenon of increasing fervor for religious 
exemptions to be written into LGBT equality bills can even be seen in the title of the 
marriage equality bill passed by the Illinois legislature: the Religious Freedom and 
Marriage Fairness Act, which legalizes same-sex marriage while ensuring that no 
religious congregation that objects to performing same-sex marriages can be forced to.114 
This is a very benign and understandable form of a religious freedom exemption, as my 
Marriage Equality USA respondent said, “No church should be forced to perform a 
wedding that they don’t want to, and everyone agrees on that… and I wouldn’t want to 
get married in a church that doesn’t want to marry me.”115 However, there are certainly 
more insidious forms of religious exemptions being attempted in state legislatures across 
the country, with an especially notable one being Arizona’s Senate Bill 1062, which 
would have allowed people greater protection when asserting their religious beliefs as a 
reason to not provide service to LGBT individuals. While both chambers of the Arizona 
legislature passed the bill, Governor Jan Brewer ultimately vetoed it on February 26, 
2013.116 Religious exemptions as a political strategy have been on the rise recently, with 
some organizations also seeking religious exemptions from certain provisions of the 
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Affordable Care Act, such as the provision of birth control through employer-provided 
health insurance. The fact that this tactic is being used across multiple political arenas 
suggests that it may be becoming a more viable strategy for, generally, more conservative 
causes. The tension between bills like Arizona’s and the legitimate religious freedoms 
regarding churches refusing to perform marriages is one that will need to be resolved in 
the coming months and years. As the marriage equality respondent said, “How are 
changes going to be implemented fairly so that we get the rights that we deserve, but so 
that freedom of speech and freedom of religion are given the respect that they 
deserve?”117 
 
Evidentiary Support 
 An effect on the opposition that was not caused by the decisions but rather noticed 
during the legal proceedings in the cases is the struggle that counsel for the opposition to 
marriage equality has in producing evidence that is compelling as a reason for why 
marriage equality should not be legal. As my respondent from NEAT said, “the 
‘traditional marriage’ side of things, those who do not support same-sex marriage, their 
arguments are usually based on tradition and prejudice. And courts don’t generally find 
that very persuasive.”118 The respondent from AFER also shared the organization’s 
experience with the opposition in the courtroom: “At the district court level, when we 
made our arguments before Judge Vaughn Walker, there was so much evidence in 
support of our side. In fact, the other side had only two witnesses that they presented. 
And one of their star witnesses actually ended up saying that the day that marriage 
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equality is allowed in this country is the day that we will be more American.”119 He also 
says that this requirement of evidence is what hampers the opposition’s ability to do well 
in the court versus when they are trying to convince voters, for example: “With a ballot 
measure, you can put up a commercial and pretty much say anything. You can use 
hyperbole; you can say whatever you want. But when you’re in a court of law, and you’re 
under oath, you have to say nothing that is untruthful.”120 An extension of this argument 
can be seen in the fact that the Supreme Court remanded Perry back to the district court 
decision based on the lack of standing of the proponents of Proposition 8; since they had 
not been actually harmed, and there was no evidence of legal harm, they did not have the 
standing to bring the case. This precedent will likely prove to be a huge boon to the 
marriage equality movement and the LGBT rights movement in general, since it suggests 
that those who cannot prove that they are legally harmed by the expansion of marriage 
rights (or again, LGBT rights overall) are not able to bring litigation challenging such 
rights in court.  
 
New Legal Precedent 
 Another change to the political environment noted by multiple organizations is 
the fact that there is now new legal precedent in federal court regarding marriage 
equality, which provides new ammunition for litigative tactics on the pro-equality side. 
As the respondent from Equality Ohio said, “it has allowed people to find cracks in the 
legal structure.”121 A slew of cases were filed in federal courts across the country during 
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the proceedings for Windsor and Perry, and many more have been filed since the 
decisions were released. The Equality Federation respondent says that the organization 
has needed to provide support much more frequently to state groups dealing with a 
lawsuit for the first time.122 Equality North Carolina’s respondent, among others, noted 
the usage of language from Windsor in a federal case filed in the state by the ACLU, 
specifically the new precedent regarding equal protection.123 And while some may write 
Perry off as having minimal impact, since the ruling only reinstated marriage equality 
within California, the fact that the decision was remanded to Judge Vaughn Walker’s 
opinion in the district court creates a good deal of useful precedent within the federal 
court system, as Judge Walker’s written opinion verges on scathing when it comes to 
Proposition 8’s proponents and their arguments against marriage equality.124 
 A major way in which the precedent set by the Supreme Court decisions has 
affected the political environment is the recent trend of federal judges striking down 
state-level constitutional bans against same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. Since the 
decisions in Windsor and Perry were handed down in June, four states have had their 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage struck down as unconstitutional by federal 
judges: Utah, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Texas.125 Additionally, a federal judge ruled that 
Kentucky’s ban on recognizing same-sex marriages performed in other states is also 
unconstitutional.126 While none of these rulings have been officially enforced, as they are 
all being appealed to higher courts, many of the judges handing down the rulings have 
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based their language off of the opinion in Windsor,127 and may also feel more 
emboldened to make decisions like these following the precedent set by the Supreme 
Court. While I was unable, time-wise, to discuss the ruling in Texas with my respondent 
from Equality Texas, the constitutional ban being overturned would be a groundbreaking 
change for the equality movement in Texas, as my respondent cited the ban as one of the 
major challenges to implementing marriage equality in the state.128 The use of the 
language from Windsor had already appeared in several lawsuits in the state, including a 
lawsuit against the city of Houston suing for city employee benefits for same-sex couples, 
which the city had implemented before the law was stayed by a judge.129 It will be 
interesting, going forward, to see how these decisions play out when they reach the 
appeals circuit, and the outcome will likely depend on the political leanings of the 
appeals circuit in which each state is located; however, it is possible that one or more of 
these cases will reach the Supreme Court in upcoming years. 
 
Value of Litigation in the Fight for Marriage Equality 
 One of the final questions that I asked the organizations that I spoke with was 
whether they thought that litigation or legislation was a better tactic on the road to 
marriage equality. Most of them were very positive about the role of the courts in the pro-
equality movement, while noting that it is key to use both litigation and legislation in 
conjunction with each other going forward. My AFER respondent pointed to the use of 
the courts as a way to combat the tyranny of the majority in the form of ballot measures, 
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which is indeed how the courts were used in the Perry case against Proposition 8.130 The 
respondent from Equality Texas emphasized that the courts are crucial, especially in this 
political environment, but that legislative initiatives are very important for wider, 
sweeping changes.131 Similarly, the respondents from both Equality Ohio and Equality 
Alabama said that while litigation is definitely a good tool, it is more useful in some 
judicial districts than others, depending on how those districts traditionally lean 
politically.132  
Many respondents from the organizations that I spoke with, especially the 
national ones, believe that the final decision on marriage equality nationally will be 
handed down by the Supreme Court at some point in the future, but that we need to reach 
a critical mass of states with legalized marriage equality before they will feel comfortable 
that such a ruling is in line with public opinion.133 The respondent from NEAT says that 
she thinks the Supreme Court would like to avoid backlash from a decision on marriage 
equality that is at all comparable to the backlash experienced after Roe v. Wade, which 
galvanized the anti-choice contingent of the country in a way that was very unexpected, 
and from which there are still repercussions today in the abortion debate.134 The 
respondent from AFER disagreed that there would be backlash on the same scale even 
following a sweeping decision regarding marriage equality: “I think with Roe v. Wade, 
you have folks that are on one side or the other, who are absolutists, where it’s an issue of 
life or death. Whereas on our issue, when people get to know their gay friends, neighbors, 
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and family members, there’s been a lot of evolution going on with people’s mentalities 
about gay marriage.”135 This trend of evolving views on the issue could mitigate any truly 
serious backlash, and given the favorable view of marriage equality among the younger 
generations,136 would likely mean a sweeping decision would not lead to a sustained 
campaign against the ruling in the same style of the anti-choice coalition. The respondent 
from Marriage Equality USA compared a sweeping Supreme Court decision in favor of 
marriage equality to Loving v. Virginia, instead, saying that at the time that Loving came 
down, two-thirds of the states had already legalized interracial marriage;137 this further 
supports the idea that the Supreme Court will likely issue a more assertive decision 
legalizing same-sex marriage on a national level when more states have legalized it on 
their own.  
 
Conclusions 
 Overall, while strategies may not have changed very significantly for the majority 
of the organizations that I interviewed, it seems that the political environment in which 
marriage equality activism operates has been affected by the rulings in Windsor and 
Perry on a variety of different levels. Effects on the opposition will alter how the two 
sides to the issue interact and combat each other (topics of contestation may change, 
litigation may become something that the opposition avoids, etc.), and it seems that most 
of the oppositional effects have been in the favor of the pro-equality movement, while 
making the opposition’s fight more challenging. While I was unfortunately unable to get 
                                                
135 AFER Respondent. 
136 Pew Research Center. 
137 Marriage Equality USA Respondent. 
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in contact with any “traditional marriage” organizations in order to discuss the rulings 
with them, the fact that so many of the organizations that I spoke with seem to believe 
that they have gained more of an upper hand as a result of the rulings is telling. The 
polling data mentioned to me by the Marriage Equality USA respondent regarding the 
high percentage of people who believe that marriage equality is inevitable also points to 
the conclusion that the anti-marriage equality movement is fighting a losing battle that 
has gotten more difficult in the past nine months. This losing battle goes hand-in-hand 
with the finding that legal precedent set by Windsor, in particular, has made it more 
common for federal judges to strike down state-level constitutional bans, and has made 
litigation a more popular strategy among the pro-equality movement. Since it has been 
discussed that anti-equality groups have a hard time making their case in court, this 
strategy could become increasingly appealing. It seems that while the decisions in Perry 
and Windsor may have been part of the growing tide of support for marriage equality, 
they have also produced favorable results that may make the final stages of legalized 
same-sex marriage on a national scale progress more quickly than they would have 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
 Based on the information that I gathered from my interviews and analyzed in 
previous chapters, it seems evident that my hypothesis, which was that the decisions in 
Windsor and Perry would both cause activist groups to change their strategies as well as 
change the political environment in which such groups were operating, was partially 
correct; while specific activism strategies have not changed for the groups that I spoke 
with, the political environment in which marriage equality activism is operating has 
definitely been altered by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hollingsworth v. Perry and 
United States v. Windsor. Beyond simply the interviews that I conducted for this project, 
there is also ample evidence that court decisions have affected LGBT rights activism in 
the past, lending credence to the idea that such an effect may have happened with the 
most recent cases as well.  
 Despite Rosenberg’s claims that the Supreme Court can never affect social 
change, it seems that Supreme Court decisions can significantly affect social change; 
changes to the political environment can open or close doors for activism on both sides of 
an issue, which can really affect how a message is able to be conveyed to the public, as 
well as the type of message being conveyed. While strategies among marriage equality 
activists may not have changed from building a strong state coalition and changing the 
hearts and minds of legislators and the general public, the messages that they have been 
able to use in order to convince people of their cause have been strengthened due to new 
court precedent on equal protection and the availability of federal benefits. Conversely, 
opponents to marriage equality have seen that their arguments against same-sex marriage, 
while effective among the general public, tend not to hold up very well as evidence in a 
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court of law; they have also lost the argument that civil unions are a valid equivalent to 
marriage with the new regulations regarding federal benefits, and have been losing the 
argument that same-sex marriage will cause civilization to collapse since 2003 and the 
ruling in Goodridge. These changes have, as mentioned in chapter four, led even those 
opposed to marriage equality to believe that it is inevitable.  
 I would also be inclined to believe that if Supreme Court decisions have affected 
the political environment this much for LGBT and marriage equality activism, decisions 
on other issues have also affected the political environment in which other activism 
operates; it would be very interesting to conduct similar studies regarding the Civil 
Rights Movement and the feminist movement, both of which Rosenberg focuses on in 
The Hollow Hope. Certainly, we already know that Roe v. Wade, a case Rosenberg 
discusses, changed the political environment in a negative way for pro-choice advocates 
by inspiring enough backlash to bring about a robust anti-choice movement that has 
persisted to this day, and does not seem to be going away anytime soon.  
 So, what does this mean for the future of marriage equality activism, and for 
LGBT rights activism in general? It will likely be difficult to say until future cases make 
it to the Supreme Court; since strategies do not seem to be something that is altered by 
court decisions, at least not ones of the nature of Perry and Windsor, any changes to the 
political environment would be highly dependent on the nature and outcome of future 
cases decided by the Supreme Court. It is also possible that activism strategies will 
change going forward in response to the shifts in the political environment, and the 
organizations themselves have yet to determine how, exactly, strategies will evolve in the 
coming months and years. It is my inclination that the next time a marriage equality case 
 68 
reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will finally make a sweeping decision that results 
in marriage equality on a national level. In this case, depending on how public opinion is 
leaning at that time, activists may want to continue working on changing hearts and 
minds; not just to prevent backlash against the decision and continue to build public 
support in favor of marriage equality, but also to continue to build support for other very 
important initiatives for LGBT rights. Marriage equality is very important to many 
members of the LGBT community, but achieving it does not mean that LGBT rights have 
forever been secured in every important area. There will still be work to be done on anti-
discrimination measures for the workplace and public accommodations, preventing bias 
and hate crimes, transgender rights, school bullying, and a whole host of other issues that 
continue to affect the LGBT community. Maintaining momentum on LGBT activism 
among the general public once the high-visibility, popular movement for marriage 
equality has achieved its goal will definitely be a challenge that the activism community 
will need to take on.  
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Appendix: Interview Questions 
 
The following questions are the general framework for the interviews that I 
conducted, although there was slight variation in the specific questions asked of each 
individual respondent due to follow-up questions, questions that were answered without 
being specifically asked, and other variables.  
1. What are the main goals of your organization in terms of marriage equality in 
your state/the nation as a whole? 
2. What were some of your main organizational strategies prior to the Supreme 
Court decisions in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry? 
3. Did your organization anticipate that these cases would be decided the way that 
they were? What would have been the ideal outcome for these cases for your 
organization? 
4. Have the decisions in these cases affected your organization’s strategies moving 
forward? How so? If not, why not? 
5. Do you think that these decisions have hindered your organization’s abilities to 
achieve your goals in any way? If so, how so?  
6. Do you have any other information regarding this topic that you think is pertinent 
to my project that you would be willing to share, or anything else that you would 
like me to know? 
7. What were major challenges to activism before the cases were decided? Have any 
of those challenges been mitigated or aggravated by the cases? 
8. Have the organizational strategies of marriage equality opponents changed since 
the cases were decided? How are you planning to combat these new strategies? 
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9. Does (and how) your state-level organization interface/coordinate with national 
organization(s)… etc? (And vice-versa for participants who are part of a national 
organization). 
10. How useful do you think litigation and court involvement are to the marriage 
equality movement overall? 
11. Who else would you recommend that I speak to regarding this subject? 
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